We investigate the robustness of existing control strategies for economically optimal frequency regulation in power grids in the presence of disruptions to the controllers' communication network. Using a strict Lyapunov function, we are able to derive exponential bounds on the convergence rate in terms of the proportion of time during which the disruption is active. This allows us to explicitly quantify the performance degradation, measured in terms of system overshoot and convergence rate.
INTRODUCTION
Modern power grids can be regarded as a large network of control areas, each producing and consuming power and transferring it to adjacent areas. The frequency of the AC signal is tightly regulated around its nominal value of e.g. 50 Hz to guarantee reliable operation of this network. Traditionally, this is achieved by means of proportional ('droop') control and PI control (Dorfler et al., 2015) . In this setup, each area compensates for its local fluctuations in load, and adjusts its production to provide previously scheduled power flows to the adjacent areas. As a result, estimates of the load in each area are required in advance to achieve economical efficiency.
Recently, renewable energy sources such as wind turbines have been introduced in significant numbers. Since these sources do not usually provide a predictable amount of power, the net load on the individual control areas will change more rapidly and by larger amounts. More substantial fluctuations are expected to occur in microgrids, which are energy systems that can operate independently of the main grid. The resulting need for more advanced control strategies for future power networks has led to the design of distributed controllers equipped with a real-time communication network (Dorfler et al., 2015; Mudumbai et al., 2012; Shafiee et al., 2014; Mojica-Nava et al., 2014; Bürger and De Persis, 2015; Trip et al., 2016) .
The addition of a communication network raises a reliability and security problem, as communication packets can be lost and digital communication networks may fall victim to failures and malicious attacks. A common disruption is the so-called Denial of Service, or DoS (Byres and Lowe, 2004) , which can be understood as a partial or total interruption of communications. This work focuses on characterizing the performance degradation of the aforementioned networks of distributed controllers under loss of information, possibly due to a DoS event.
Literature review
The current research on frequency regulation in power networks is reviewed in Ibraheem et al. (2005) . Since this field of research receives considerable amounts of attention, we will summarize a subset of results that are close to our interest.
Frequency stability and control in power networks is a wellestablished field of research which has lead to important results for a variety of models (see e.g. Bergen and Hill (1981) ; Tsolas et al. (1985) ). More recently, distributed control methods have been proposed to guarantee not only frequency regulation but also economic optimality. In a microgrid context, distributed averaging integral control is well-studied (Simpson-Porco et al., 2013; Bürger and De Persis, 2015; Dorfler et al., 2015; Trip et al., 2014) . In the context of power networks, distributed internalmodel-based optimal controllers have also been studied (Bürger and De Persis, 2015; Trip et al., 2016) . As a complementary approach to distributed integral or internalmodel controllers, primal-dual gradient controllers (Li et al., 2014; Zhang and Papachristodoulou, 2013; Stegink et al., 2016) are able to handle general convex objective functions as well as constraints, but in turn require much information about the power network parameters.
The robustness of power networks under various controllers has been investigated in the works above to varying degree. In this light, it is useful to consider strictly decreasing arXiv:1608.03798v2 [math.OC] 16 Nov 2016 energy functions (Malisoff and Mazenc, 2009 ). Zhao et al. (2015) make a first attempt to arrive at one, and their effort is expanded upon by in the context of time-delayed communication. Bearing this in mind, we propose a construction of a new strict Lyapunov function for the purpose of explicitly quantifying the performance of power systems in the presence of communication disruption.
As an aplication of robustness measures, we will investigate the effect of Denial of Service. It, and related phenomena, have been studied as well. See e.g. Byres and Lowe (2004) for an introduction to the subject. It can be modeled as a stochastic process (Befekadu et al., 2011 (Befekadu et al., , 2015 , a resource-constrained process (Gupta et al., 2010) , or using only constraints on the proportion of time it is active Tesi, 2015, 2014b) . Correspondingly, the investigations of systems under DoS events vary, with focus being on planning transmissions outside the disruption intervals (Shisheh Foroush and Martínez, 2013) , limiting the maximum ratio of time during which DoS is active , or guaranteeing stability regardless and quantifying convergence behavior Tesi, 2015, 2014b) . The latter approach offers interesting perspectives, since the specific characterization of the period of time during which communication is not permitted adopted in De Persis and Tesi (2014b) allows for great flexibility and can conveniently model both genuine loss of communication or packet drops due to malicious behaviour. Furthermore, the analysis of De Tesi (2015, 2014b ) is based on Lyapunov functions, can handle nonlinearities Tesi, 2014a, 2016) as well as distributed systems (Senejohnny et al., 2015 (Senejohnny et al., , 2016 , and therefore is well suited for the class of nonlinear networked models describing power networks.
Main contributions
The contribution of this paper is twofold. The first part is primarily theoretical: existing approaches to the problem of optimal frequency control have relied on non-strictly decreasing energy -or Lyapunov functions, using LaSalle's invariance principle and related results to guarantee convergence to an invariant manifold on which the Lyapunov function's derivative vanishes. Since this does not lead to strong results on exponential convergence, we design a strictly decreasing Lyapunov function that does.
The second part makes use of the developed Lyapunov function to show exponential convergence to the optimal solution, and directly relate the speed of convergence to the physical parameters of the system and the availability of the communication network. As a result, the resilience of the aforementioned economically optimal control strategies to DoS events is quantified explicitly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline our model for the power network, goals for its control, and existing control strategies we will use. Then, in Section 3, we derive a strictly decreasing Lyapunov function, and use it to show existence of an exponential bound on convergence of the system to the optimal solution. In Section 5, we illustrate the result using numerical simulations of an academic model of a power network. Finally, Section 6 presents conclusions.
SETTING
We consider a power grid, represented here by a set of n buses. The network of power lines between the buses is represented by a connected, acyclic, arbitrarily oriented graph with n nodes and m edges, with ±1-valued incidence matrix B. The orientation is necessary for analytical purposes but otherwise meaningless; the physical network is undirected.
We will use a structure-preserving model for the nodes. Following Bergen and Hill (1981) , we consider these nodes to be either a generator or a load node. Accordingly, we define the sets G and L of generator and load nodes with cardinality n G and n L respectively, such that n G + n L = n.
The dynamics at each bus is considered in a reference frame that rotates with a certain nominal frequency, analogous to earlier work (Trip et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2015) . The dynamics can be denoted in the following form, also known as the swing equations. At generator node i,
whereas at load node i,
Here, γ ij = B ij V i V j for each edge connecting buses i and j. We summarize the symbols used in Table 1 . Remark 1. (Microgrid model). In e.g. a microgrid setting, Kron-reduced models are sometimes employed as a simplification (Schiffer et al., 2014) , alongside more complex differential-algebraic equations Simpson-Porco et al., 2013; . In this paper, we consider the high-voltage-oriented Bergen-Hill model, instead of more accurate models of microgrids, to avoid further complications in the analysis to be carried out. The consideration of more realistic scenarios is left for future research.
For ease of computation, we will write the dynamics (1) in vectorized form as follows:
Whenever a coordinate or parameter is used without subscript, it refers to the concatenated version; e.g.
Finally, when used with vector arguments, sin and cos are defined element-wise.
Control goal
A primary goal in control of power networks is to regulate the frequency deviation to zero. In steady state, (2) then becomes
Under the assumption, which we will formalize later, that a solution to (3) exists, we multiply this equation from the left by 1 , keeping in mind that 1 B = 0 . This yields Vector of voltages at the buses B ∈ R m×m Matrix of susceptances of the transmission lines Q ∈ R n×n + Diagonal matrix of generation costs 1 (ū − P ) = 0 as a goal for the control input. See Lemma 4 in Trip et al. (2016) for a more formal discussion.
In modern power systems, generators do not always have the same capacity. For this reason, a controller structure that allows the more powerful, cheaper generators to do most of the work are more attractive. The controllers used in the following sections make use of the concept of economic optimality introduced in e.g. Bürger et al. (2014) ; Dorfler et al. (2015) . In this framework, we consider the cost to be dependent only on the amount of power produced, as transmission and other costs are relatively small. Each generator input u i , i = 1, . . . , n is assigned a convex cost function C i (u i ). We can then define a convex cost function
An optimal steady state solution to (2) is therefore defined as the one that minimizes the costs of power generation while balancing power supply and demand.
The problem of economic dispatch was addressed by the distributed controllers introduced concurrently and independently in number of papers, which we cover next. The main objective of this work is to explicitly characterize the performance of these controllers, that is, the speed at which the system converges to its optimal solution. Then, their robustness against communication disruptions, to be defined precisely in Subsection 2.3, is made explicit as well.
Economically optimal controller
In this subsection, we briefly recall the control strategy detailed in e.g. Dorfler et al. (2015) ; Dörfler et al. (2013) In the following material, we will assume cost function C is quadratic. Restricting it to this form allows to avoid load and/or power flow measurements. Writing C(u) = 1 2 u Qu, with Q a positive diagonal matrix, we introduce the Lagrangian function L(u, λ) = C(u) + λ1 (u − P ), where λ ∈ R denotes the Lagrange multiplier. Noting that L is strictly convex in u and concave in λ, there is a saddle point solution (ū,λ) to max λ min u L(u, λ) satisfying ∇C(ū) + 1λ = 0 1 (ū − P ) = 0, which is (Trip et al., 2016 , Lemma 3)
Note that at the optimum, the power generated at each node i is proportional to the inverse of its marginal cost
Note that it is possible that in steady state, η = 0, i.e. the flows on the power lines are nonzero. This assumption, captures the necessity of a power network with a capacity large enough to transport the required power from generators with high capacity to areas with high demand. Remark 3. (Security constraint). The extra condition on η is standard in power grid stability investigations and is usually called the security constraint (Dorfler et al., 2015) . We modify it slightly by making explicit the distance ofη i from ±π/2. This will be necessary later to show boundedness of the trajectories of (2), and to derive explicit expressions for its rate of decay. Remark 4. (Uniqueness of solutions). If an optimal steady state solution exists, it is unique. To see why, suppose there are two solutionsη,η that satisfy (3) withū as determined by (4) and ω = 0. Note that, by Assumption 2,θ exists such thatη = Bθ, and analogouslyθ exists. Then, by subtracting the versions of (3) and multiplying on the left byθ −θ , we get (θ −θ ) BΓ(sin(η) − sin(η )) = 0, or equivalently, (η −η ) Γ(sin(η) − sin(η )) = 0. Since Γ is positive definite, and since η ∈ Θ, we must conclude thatη =η .
We now introduce the distributed control algorithm (Monshizadeh and De Persis, 2017; Dörfler et al., 2013; Zhao et al., 2015) . At each node, a controller actuates the local energy production u. Economic optimality is achieved by fitting the controllers with an undirected, connected, delayfree communication network, represented by a graph with Laplacian matrix L ξ . The dynamics of the controllers at the nodes are then given bẏ
) Proposition 5. (Monshizadeh and De Persis, 2017 , Section 4) Under Assumption 2, the controllers at the nodes given by (6) guarantee that solutions to the system (2), in closed loop with these controllers, locally converge to the largest invariant set where (η, ω, ξ) = (η, 0,ξ :=ū opt ), provided they start in a neighborhood of (η, 0,ξ).
The implication of this Proposition is that the distributed controllers (6), with appropriate initialization, are able to steer ω to zero and achieve economically optimal generation of power without measuring the total fixed demand and generation, P .
Intermittent feedback measurements
In the current setting, we consider the case in which the communication graph is disrupted, for example due to equipment failure or through sabotage by an external agent. To quantify the impact of this disruption on performance, we consider the worst-case scenario in which all communication links fail simultaneously during the disruption period. Without communication, the controllers will still ensure that ω → 0, but can no longer guarantee economic optimality (Trip et al., 2016, Remark 6) and are vulnerable to noise in measurements (Andreasson et al., 2014) .
We distinguish between the following two states:
(1) the nominal state, in which the system and controllers operate as detailed previously; (2) the denial-of-service (DoS) state, setting L ξ = 0 n×n in (6). Remark 6. Notice that a third state is possible, in which a subset of the communication links is interrupted. While our results continue to hold for this case, the conditions derived, namely Theorem 17, turn out to be conservative. A way to reduce this conservatism is to exploit the notion of persistency of communications and uniform connectivity inspired by Senejohnny et al. (2016); Arcak (2007) . However, this study involves a number of additional steps and is not pursued in this paper. A detailed treatment is instead postponed to a future work.
The system under consideration can now be formalized as follows (De Persis and Tesi, 2014b) . Let h i ≥ 0 denote the starting time of the i th DoS failure, i.e. the time of i th DoS transition from inactive to active. Furthermore, let τ i > 0 denote the length of the i th DoS failure, such that h i + τ i < h i+1 . We then denote the i th DoS interval by H i := [h i , h i + τ i ). During these intervals, no communication is possible between the controllers. The choice of these intervals is not allowed to be completely arbitrary; limiting the duration of the failure is necessary for closed-loop stability to be achievable at all. In this light, the DoS failure is restricted as follows.
Given a sequence {H i , i = 1, . . . , k}, let
denote the union of DoS intervals up to time t. Assumption 7. (De Persis and Tesi, 2014b, Assumption 1) The constants k, h i , τ i can be chosen freely within the constraints mentioned above, provided that |Ξ(t)| > 0 and that there exist positive constants τ , κ such that for all t ≥ 0,
The rationale behind this inequality is that, if κ = 0, the DoS failure is active at most a proportion of 1/τ of the time (since τ > 1). Adding κ is necessary, since if h 0 = 0, |Ξ(τ 0 )| = τ 0 ≥ τ 0 /τ , hence τ 0 is required to be zero. The addition of κ > 0 therefore allows the failure to be active at the start of the interval under consideration.
No further conditions are placed on the structure of the DoS state, allowing it to occur aperiodically, allowing subsequent events to differ in length, and allowing any or no specific stochastic distribution Tesi, 2014b, 2015) .
MAIN RESULT
To arrive at an exponential bound on the speed of convergence, we first design a strictly decreasing Lyapunov function. We then derive an exponential upper bound for the Lyapunov function value, and discuss several implications.
Strict Lyapunov function
The analysis below makes heavy use of the theory around incrementally passive systems. The system (2)- (6) is incrementally passive with respect to the steady state solution introduced in Assumption 2 (Trip et al., 2016, Theorem 1) . As such, we combine (2) and (3) to arrive at an incremental version of the closed-loop system with respect to a steady state solution (η, 0,ξ):
We introduce the following Lyapunov function candidate, with parameters 1 , 2 > 0 to be determined later. Note that (9a) below is common in the study of the class of incrementally passive systems, while the addition of (9b) will ensure that W is strictly decreasing along any solution to (8) other than the desired equilibrium (η, 0,ξ):
Note that W vanishes at the equilibrium (η, 0,ξ) of (2). In addition, we have the following Lemma. Lemma 8. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. There exist sufficiently small 1 , 2 and positive constants c, c such that
For ease of notation, we will omit the explicit parameters of x G in the rest of the paper.
To prove this Lemma, we make use of an intermediate result.
Lemma 9. For eachη ∈ Θ, positive scalars µ, µ exist such that for all η ∈ Θ,
Proof We apply the Mean Value Theorem element-wise to find that aη exists for each η such thatη ∈ Θ and sin(η) − sin(η) = diag(cosη)(η −η).
We now define µ := min i∈{1,...,m} η∈Θ cos 2 (η i ).
Since cos(η) > 0 for each η ∈ Θ,η ∈ Θ and since Θ is convex, µ η −η 2 ≤ sin(η) − sin(η) 2 .
Analogously, we define µ := max i∈{1,...,m} η∈Θ cos 2 (η i ).
Remark 10. Depending on the choice ofη, the values of µ and µ vary. However, if we are content with slightly more pessimistic values, we can be more explicit and set µ = sin 2 (ρ) and µ = 1.
We are now in the position to prove Lemma 8.
Proof of Lemma 8
To show the existence of the lower and upper bounds, we will first investigate the quadratic terms of W (η, ω, ξ), (9a). This will lead to initial estimates for the bounds of the entirety of W (η, ω, ξ). Then, by an appropriate choice of the i occurring in (9b), we will limit and quantify the deviation from these estimates caused by the cross-terms.
Lower bound. The quadratic terms of W (η, ω, ξ) given in (9a) are certainly positive, since M and I are diagonal matrices with positive elements. They require that c ≤ min(λ min (M ), λ min (Q)). Since U (η) is a strongly convex function of η for η ∈ Θ, the quantity
is strictly positive for η =η and, for some convex combinationη of η andη, equal to (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004 , Section 9.1.2, page 459)
Denoting the smallest eigenvalue forη ∈ Θ of this Hessian by ν, we therefore have
which is positive outside equilibria. This part requires that c ≤ ν µ Γ 2 , with µ from Lemma 9. Finally, we must deal with the cross terms (9b), for which we will use extensively the following consequence of Young's inequality and the triangle inequality: for two vectors a, b,
For the first cross-term,
whereas for the second one,
We conclude therefore that the cross terms (9b) of the Lyapunov function are lower bounded by
where m := max(
Note that we have previously been able to set the lower bound for the quadratic terms at min(λ min (M ), λ min (Q),
we can be sure that the entire Lyapunov function is lower bounded by c x G 2 .
Upper bound. Again, we note that
where ν now denotes the largest eigenvalue of the Hessian of U forη ∈ Θ.
Finally, we note that we can bound the cross terms again by the quadratic terms; this is accomplished by using (10) and (11) directly. As a result, the cross terms are upper bounded by
and again we make sure i are sufficiently small that
We conclude that W is upper bounded by c x G 2 .
Remark 11. Note that ν and ν are eigenvalues of ∇ 2 U , which can be explicitly written as the diagonal matrix Γ diag(cosη). Hence ν ≥ λ min (Γ) sin(ρ) and ν ≤ λ max (Γ).
Derivative of the Lyapunov function
To prove that W (η, ω, ξ) is strictly decreasing along solutions of (2) and (6), we must compute its derivative with respect to time. For ease of notation, we define x(η, ω, ξ) := col(∇U (η) − ∇U (η), ω, ξ −ξ) and T := block diag(B, I n , I n ). As with x G , we omit the parameter list of x in the following. Lemma 12. The time derivative of W (η, ω, ξ) along solutions of (8) Proof Using (8), the part of W (η, ω, ξ) independent of i has derivative ω (−Dω − B(∇U (η) − ∇U (η)) + (ξ −ξ))
which follows from the observations that
and that L ξ Qξ = 0 by (5). Meanwhile, the derivative of the first cross-term is
Having computed the time derivativeẆ (η, ω, ξ), we now show W (η, ω, ξ) is strictly decreasing using the following Lemma. Lemma 13. Suppose G is acyclic. Then, for all η ∈ Θ, there exist sufficiently small values of 1 and 2 , T K(η)T is a strictly positive definite matrix.
To prove this lemma, we discuss first an intermediate result that allows us to conveniently deal with the cross terms. Lemma 14. Given four appropriately sized matrices A, B, C and D,
Proof. For any appropriately sized pair of vectors u and v, let x := u v . Then
Proof of Lemma 13 For notational convenience, we will refer to K(η) as just K. The proof consists of three parts. First, we reduce K to a block diagonal form K using the preceding Lemma. Then we discuss the two blocks of K .
Block diagonal form. In the notation of Lemma 14, let A := K 12 , the top left block of K, and let D := K 3 , the bottom right block. Furthermore,
It follows immediately that B C is the top right offdiagonal block of K. Moreover, 
which again is positive definite for sufficiently small i .
Bottom right block of K . Next, QL ξ Q and 3 2 11 are both positive semidefinite matrices. For their sum not to be strictly positive definite, there must exist a nonzero vector x in the intersection of the null spaces of 11 and QL ξ Q.
Therefore, this sum of matrices is strictly positive definite.
To deal with the subtraction of (
2 )I, we must introduce this paper's only constraint relating the i :
Given that G is acyclic, T is left-invertible, so T KT > 0 as well. Remark 15. The acyclic condition guarantees that the matrix T has full column rank and thus T K(η)T > 0 for any K(η) > 0. In Section 4 we discuss how this assumption can be relaxed for a linearized version of the power network dynamics (1).
Boundedness of the solutions
Having shown that W (η, ω, ξ) is strictly decreasing along solutions of the closed-loop system, we verify boundedness of the solutions. To do so, we show that W (η, ω, ξ) is strongly convex. Lemma 16. The Hessian of W (η, ω, ξ), considered as a function of redge, ω G and ξ is positive definite for all ω G and ξ and for all η ∈Θ := (−π/2, π/2) m .
Proof. The Hessian of
and ∇ 2 = ∇∇ denotes the 'Hessian of' operator. Since for some m > 0, ∇ 2 U (η) ≥ mI (by the strong convexity of U discussed in lemma 8) onΘ, and M ≥ λ min (M )I, we know that the Hessian is diagonally dominant for i sufficiently small. Since it is also symmetric, it is positive definite.
Therefore, as a consequence of Lemmas 13 and 16, there exists a compact level set around (η, 0,ξ) which is forward invariant. This will guarantee the boundedness of solutions, and validates the lower and upper bounds in Lemma 8 along the solutions of the system initialized in this set.
Convergence bounds
Having quantified the convergence rate of W (η, ω, ξ), we are now able to do the same for solutions to (2) in closed loop with the controllers (6). Recalling our control objective, we will also consider the effect of a DoS event, which interrupts the communication between controllers as detailed in Assumption 7. We conclude, by characterizing the behavior of the system in terms of the parameters of the DoS: Theorem 17. Consider a system (2) in closed loop with the controllers (6) satisfying Assumption 2. Set c := min η∈Θ λ min (T K(η)T ). Furthermore, suppose the communication between the controllers is subject to an intermittent DoS event satisfying Assumption 7. For solutions to the closed-loop system starting in the compact level set around the equilibrium as stated in Section 3.3, we have for all t ≥ 0
where c := c /c, α = e κc c/c and β = c
= −cW (η, ω, ξ). (13) We integrate both sides of this inequality to produce
In the presence of DoS, we note thatẆ (η, ω, ξ) ≤ 0. As such, for the disrupted system, the decay of W (η, ω, ξ) is instead bounded as follows:
and therefore, using Lemma 8,
The result follows by substituting α and β in the above. Remark 18. We note that these bounds directly relate bounds on the behavior of the closed loop power network, specifically the overshoot α and convergence rate β, to a combination of the physical and cyber parameters of the system and the ongoing DoS event. This quantifies the performance degradation of the system as a result of the disruption.
This is consistent with earlier characterizations of the nominal and DoS states of the closed-loop system: frequency regulation is guaranteed regardless of DoS, while economic optimality can only be guaranteed given its occasional absence.
CYCLIC GRAPHS
In the preceding results, we based our derivations on the assumption that the physical network between the nodes is acyclic. Of course, this assumption limits the connectivity of the network and therefore its robustness to single-link failures. In this section, we consider cyclic graphs.
Without modification of the model, we can only reproduce a weaker version of Lemma 13: Lemma 19. Suppose G contains cycles. For sufficiently small values of 1 and 2 ,Ẇ (η, ω, ξ) < 0 for all x = 0.
Proof. Note that K(η) > 0 for sufficiently small values of i , as detailed in the proof of Lemma 13. Therefore,Ẇ ≤ −λ min (K(η)) T x 2 . This expression is strictly negative unless
If this true, necessarily ω = 0, ξ =ξ and BΓ(sin η − sinη) = 0. But in that case,
and because (η i −η i )Γ i (sin η i − sinη i ) ≥ 0 for each i and for η,η ∈ Θ,
for all i. Therefore, we must conclude sin η = sinη, that is, we are at the equilibrium.
In this case, no explicit version of Theorem 17 can be derived, because there is no explicit upper bound oṅ W (η, ω, ξ) in terms of x 2 . It is however possible to derive such if we restrict ourselves to a linearized version of the dynamics.
Linear dynamics
We will derive a new, linearized model of the power grid. Recall (1), written here with a linear coupling between nodes.
For computational convenience, we introduce a slightly different change of coordinates, and set δ = θ − 1 n 11 θ. This allows the notatioṅ δ = Πω, where Π = I − 1 n 11 ,
in which we have used the fact that BΠ = B to arrive at the second line, and defined M , D, Γ and B as before.
Once again, we find the steady state with zero frequency deviation by solving 0 = −BΓB Πθ +ū − P, settingδ := Πθ. Summing the elements yields the optimal control input discussed before, which we then substitute forū such that
This equation denotes the exchange of power along the edges of the physical network, as necessitated by the demand and production. As such, we assume that a solution to this equality exists.
We note that the equilibrium is unique by presuming two distinct valuesδ,δ satisfy the above. Then,
, and given that Γ > 0, this implies that B (δ −δ ) = 0, henceδ −δ = c1 for some c ∈ R. Observing that Π 2 = Π, we multiply on the left by Π to getδ −δ = 0.
Denote the power network with controllers (6) by the following linear version of (8):
which we note is a quadratic form of z := col(ΓB (δ − δ), ω, ξ −ξ) and positive outside of equilibria for sufficiently small 1 and 2 , so an analogy of Lemma 8 is trivial. Lemma 20. Positive scalars c, c exist such
The time derivative of the Lyapunov function becomeṡ W (z) = −z T KT z with T and K as in Subsection 3.2, but with L 1 := sp(M BΓB ). The proof that λ min (K) > 0 is analogous to that of Lemma 13. Proof. Let L := BΓB . Recall that B = B Π and that img Π ⊥ R(1). Assuming that the physical graph is connected, the only eigenvector of L belonging to 0 is 1 (and its multiples). Hence
Because the second and third component of both vectors T z and z are equal, we need to ensure the factor is not higher than 1. Hence, c z := min(λ 2 (L) 2 /λ max (BB ), 1). Note that c z is positive because both L and BB are positive definite. Corollary 22. A positive constant c exists such thaṫ W (z) ≤ −cW (z).
Proof. Note thaṫ
As a result, we obtain an analogy to Theorem 17: Theorem 23. Consider a system (16). Set c := min η∈Θ λ min (T KT ). For solutions to the closed-loop system starting in the compact level set around the equilibrium as stated in Section 3.3, we have for all t ≥ 0
where c := c /c.
SIMULATIONS
To illustrate the effect of interrupted communication, we simulate the action of the controllers, along with the values of W , on an academic example of an electricity grid, taken from Trip et al. (2016) . The network contains four nodes, connected by a circle graph as depicted in Figure 1 . Two nodes are generators, two nodes are loads. The parameter values are listed in Table 2a .
The network was first initialized to a steady state with load profile P = 0. At t = 0, the profile was changed to the values in Table 2a , and the system was subjected to a DoS sequence. The sequence starts with 2.5 s of DoS, and then alternates between a period of uniformly random length between 0 and 1 s of communication, and a period of random length between 1 and 3 s of DoS. Hence, κ = 2.5 and τ = . As is visible in Figure 2 , the system returns to the desired steady state, and the Lyapunov function is strictly decreasing, despite having only sporadic short windows during which communication is possible. Figure 3 shows the same simulation without DoS events for comparison. The numerical values of the parameters relating to convergence are displayed in Table 2b .
CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the performance of the distributed internalmodel-based controllers from Monshizadeh and De Persis (2017) ; Trip et al. (2016) when their communication network is intermittently interrupted. Even when the interruptions active nearly all the time, exponential stability is guaranteed, although the transient deteriorates. Furthermore, we have derived a bound on the decay rate of the solutions in terms of properties of the interruption sequence.
Disruptions of other natures can be considered; sophisticated adversaries may opt to delay the communication signal or even inject false measurements. Also, this work considers only the case where communications are entirely removed; perhaps less conservative results can be obtained by considering disruption of a subset of the communication links as in e.g. Senejohnny et al. (2016) .
Finally, it would be desirable to tighten the bounds obtained in Theorem 17. At the moment, they are very conservative, especially when compared to the results from our case study. 
